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THE "AD COELUM" MAXIM AS APPLIED
TO AVIATION LAW

T IIE rapid development of the use of the air as a medium

of commercial transportation has raised the question of
the application of the ancient maxim "Cujus est solum eius
est usque ad coelum et ad inferas" which means "He who
owns the soil owns everything above and below, from heaven
to hell."' The maxim had its origin in England and followed the body of common law from that country into the
jurisprudence of the United States. In order to understand
why the maxim is important we must trace it to its origin
and then follow it back down through the courts as it has
been applied to specific cases. Although the courts have
never hesitated to deny its application -to cases involving
aviation, it is still being offered as a plea when property
owners believe they are being damaged by the operation of
aircraft over their property or by the proximity of airports
to their homes.
About 1200 this maxim was being cited in discussing rights
under the Justinian Code.2 It is supposed to have been
1 Other interpretations of this Latin phrase are: Whose is the soil his it is
from -the heavens to the depths of the earth." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 304;
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adopted by Lord Coke from a glossator on Justinian's Digest
of Roman Law. Eugene Sauze, in 1916, traced the maxim
to Franciscus Accursius of Bologna (circa 1200).1 Blackstone restated and discussed the maxim in his famous Commentaries and many of our modern courts have applied it
in real property cases.
But maxims are not law. It has been said 4 that at best
they are not meant to take the place of a digest; maxims
are neither definitions nor treatises; some ought to be
amended and some ought to be discarded altogether. Certainly where progress is being retarded by the application in
a modem court of law or equity it is unreasonable to apply
a maxim as a rule of law.
No court has ever said that ownership of the air extends
upward to an indefinite distance, since such a question has
never been presented to a court for decision. All that the
courts have said is that ownership of air space may extend
to a point necessary for the enjoyment of the land, and the
rest is "free air." Naturally there is a difference in the use
of air space by landowners. An owner of a skyscraper office building is using the air space above the land to a higher
point than a farmer who tills the soil. Statutory law has in
many instances provided specific measurements to be applied in determining how much air space a landowner must
have above his property to enjoy safely his ownership of
the land. In any event, courts in protecting the owner of
land will not hamper the development of air commerce.
In 1586 in the case of Bury v. Pope,5 which was the first
recorded case in which the maxim was quoted, it was held
"He who possesses the land possesseth also that which is above it." Broom,
Legal Maxims 8th ed. p. 395. See also: 3 journal of Air Law, 329 and 531;
Hotchkiss, Aviation Law (1938).
2 The maxim is the basis of a portion of the Civil Code of Napoleon.
3 See also Bouve, Private Ownership of Air Space, 1 Air Law Review 242
(1930).
4 Smith, The Use of Maxims in jurisprudence, 9 Harvard Law Review 13
(1885).
5 1 Cro. Eliz. 118, 78 Eng. Rep. 375 (1586).
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that where a landowner erects a house so close to a window
on the adjoining property that the light is cut off therefrom,
the injured landowner has no complaint even though his
building and his window were built forty years before the
second building was erected.
Later in 1597 6 the maxim was successfully invoked in a
case where rainwater fell on plaintiff's land from the roof
of defendant's building which overhung the land of plaintiff.
In 1611 7 again the maxim was cited to uphold the right of
a plaintiff to abate a nuisance from an overhanging roof.
After 1611 it does not appear again for more than two hundred years, when as dictum in a case involving a board overhanging plaintiff's garden' this maxim was invoked. Here
the first mention was made of the possible application of the
maxim to aviation cases when Lord Ellenborough said
" * * * if this board overhanging the plaintiff's garden be a

trespass, it would follow that an aeronaut is liable to an action of trespass quare clausum fregit at the suit of the occupier of every field over which his balloon passes in the
course of his voyage." The court held that the board overhanging was not a trespass.
These cases were followed by several others, until in 1920
the English Air Navigation Act was passed which provided
that no action should lie in trespass by reason of the flight
of aircraft over property at a reasonable height above the
ground. In the only reported case construing this statute,
the court dismissed the action which was a suit in equity to
enjoin the flying of planes over a private school.'
In American courts in common law states it has been held
that an action in trespass shall lie where one shoots across
the land of another,1" thrusting an arm across a neighbor's
6

Penruddod's Case, 5 Coke's Rep. 100.
Raten's Case, 9 Coke's Rep. 53, 77 Eng. Rep. 810.
8 Pickering v. Rudd, 4 Campb. 219, I StarckIe 56; 171 Eng. Rep. 70.
9 Roedean School v. Cornwall Aviation Co. Ltd., 99 Cent. L. J. 311. See:
MoeHer, Law of Civil Aviation, 1936, p. 184 and following.
10 Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327, 43 Sup Ct. 135, 67 L.
Ed. 287 (1922).
7
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property in a belligerent fashion, 1 erecting crossarms on a
telephone pole to extend over the property of another, 2 and
other like acts. Also the construction of subways and tunnels at considerable distances underneath the ground has
been held to interfere with the surface owner's property.'"
In 1921 the American Bar Association's Special Committee
on Law of Aviation repudiated the -theory as inapplicable to
air rights in the aviation field. The court in the Johnson
case '4 (1928) deciding this specific question, said: " * * *
This rule, like many aphorisms of the law, is a generality,
and does not have its origin in legislation, but was adopted
in an age of primitive industrial development, by the courts
of England, long prior to the American Revolution, as a
comprehensive statement of the landowner's rights, at a
time when any practical use of the upper air was not considered or thought possible, and when such aerial trespasses
as did occur were relatively near to the surface of the land,
and were such as to exercise some direct harmful influence
upon the owner's use and enjoyment of the land. A wholly
different situation is now presented. " * * * The upper air is
a natural heritage common to all of the people, and its
reasonable use ought not to be hampered by an ancient artificial maxim of law such as is here invoked."
From these cases it is obvious that 'the "ad coelum" theory
has never been the law with respect to air space rights in
the aviation field. The law must encourage the development
of science, and not hinder it. Until aviation cases began to
be tried in the courts, the maxim had not been important
and could be applied or not in the individual cases without
serious harm. When -trespass by aeronautics began to be
alleged by landowners over whose land the planes flew in
11
12

Hannabolson v. Sessions, 116 Iowa 457, 90 N. W. 93 (1902).
Cumberland T. & T. Co. v. Barnes, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 1290, 101 S. W. 301

(1907).
13
14

(1928).

Matter of New York, 215 N. Y. 109, N. E. 104 (1915).
Johnson v. Curtiss N. W. Airplane Co. Minn., U. S. Aviation Reports 42
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commercial flights, a definite rule had to be laid down against
the plea involving this ancient maxim. The courts did not
hesitate to refuse to hear such cases when the only complaint was the trespass under the "ad coelum" maxim, and
to encourage aviation by holding the air to be free above
certain prescribed distances, laid down by federal and state
statutes.
This refusal of the courts to apply the maxim to aviation
cases brings up an interesting question: if the landowner
does not now own the air above to the heavens, may he obtain title to the air above his property to a height greater
than his actual use of the space?
Real estate is the most corporeal of corporeal things. Its
ownership can be definitely established and the limitations
defined. But can such an abstract thing as air space be so
owned, and so limited? Air obviously cannot, but it may
be that space as such may be subject to ownership. This
fact has been recognized by the courts for many years. In
1864 an Illinois court held that the owner of a second story
of a building had the right to have his floor and walls supported by the owner of the first floor who also owned the
land beneath.15 This case apparently decided that there
was a right to sell and to own a stratum of space.
In 1898 16 the same court held that the owner of a structure projecting over an alley had the ownership of the space
he was using, subject to the alley use.
In 1903 again in Illinois a court had to consider a bill for
partition involving the fee simple title of the second and
third stories of 'a brick building where the defense was that
the property was not real estate and therefore, not subject
to partition. The court said "A house or even the upper
chambers of a house may be held separately from the soil
on which it stands, and an action of ejectment will lie to
15

16

McConnel v. Kibbe, 33 Ill. 175 (1864).
West Side Elevated Railroad Co. v. Springer, 171 IMI. 170 (1898).
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recover it. .

.

.We are of the opinion that the second and

third stories were not personal property but were real
estate." '" Again the court recognized the right to ownership of space.
In Missouri in 1900 18 a similar question was before the
courts. There the owner of land decided to build a twostory building and granted by written conveyance to the
Knights of Pythias Lodge the right to build a third story
which would be the exclusive property of the lodge. The
lodge made a contract with the same contractor hired by
the owner of the land, and the contractor subsequently
sought to get a mechanic's lien upon the lot and the entire
building for his entire bill. The court held that the titles
were separate and that the contractor was entitled to a lien
but separately for the work done by him for each builder.
In 1915 a South Carolina court said that there was nothing invalid in a deed which granted certain property, but
limited the grantee's right to build higher than fourteen
feet from the ground.19
In 1923 a Washington bank owned property on both sides
of an alley. The city undertook to vacate the alley above
an imaginary horizontal plane sixteen feet above the ground.
The court said that the city could vacate a part of the alley
in width, or length, and that there was no reason why they
could not also vacate a part in altitude.2"
More recently an interesting deed has been recognized as
valid, where a tract of land in the city of Chicago was platted
to show several hundred circles of ground. The land, owned
by the Northwestern Railroad, was thus platted and the
circles deeded to Marshall Field. The deed describes this
land as "all the land, property, and space (italic ours) at
and below horizontal plane zero Chicago City Datum in
Madison v. Madison, 206 Ill. 534 (1903).
Badger Lumber Co. v. Stepp, 157 Mo. 366 (1900).
19 Pearson v. Matheson, 102 S. C. 377 (1915).
20 Taft v. Washington Mutual Savings Bank, 127 Wash. 503 (1923).
17

18
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296 complete cylinders formed by projecting vertically downward from said plane the circles forming the boundaries of
said lots as represented on the plat." The deed further calls
for the transfer of title to what is called an air lot, being all
the space within the prescribed area above a specified plane.
The interesting thought is that if it is possible to purchase
a three-dimensional tract and have actual title to air space
as in this case, there is certainly no reason to assume that
purchases of air space where the space can be described sufficiently, for other purposes. Whether the courts may hold
that such deeds are good only where the air space is to be
put to a specific use, or whether one might buy air space to
prevent its use by airplanes for instance, is doubtful.
The more recent cases brought by the owners of property
against aviators flying over and causing damage to the landowner are brought upon the nuisance theory and all of them
are for actual damages and/or injunctive relief. A leading
case is the Swetland case 21 in Ohio. Here the Swetlands
owned land near Richmond Heights, Ohio on which they had
constructed residences at a cost of about $115,000. After the
construction of -the residences the Curtiss Airports Corporation purchased land immediately opposite the Swetland
homes across the road, where they intended to construct and
operate an airport. Despite notice by the Swetlands that
such use would destroy the use of the residences the Curtiss
Corporation went on with their plans. An action to enjoin
the airport's construction was brought in the District Court
asking that airplanes be prohibited from flying over the
Swetland place at less than 500 feet, and for other injunctive
relief. The relief was refused by the court, in these words:
"We first consider the contention that the flying of an aeroplane through the air space over plaintiff's land is a trespass
which, when recurring as a necessary incident to the operation of the air field, must be enjoined. The proposition is
21

Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp. S5 F. (2d) 201 (1932).
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affirmed by appellants upon the maxim, Cujus est solum est
usque ad coelum. We are told that this maxim was imported
into the English law by Lord Coke and that it has been approved in Baten's Case * * * and others. The popularity of
the phrase with the courts of this country is attested by its
repetition in -the law reports of practically every state. Its
relation to aviation has been the subject of much discussion
in the legal literature of the past ten years. We do not discuss these numerous articles nor the authorities referred to
in argument, many of which are cited in the opinion of the
trial court. It is said that the early cases which embedded
the maxim into the body of the law were decided upon the
theory of nuisance and not trespass. We cannot admit that
basis of decision. But none of those cases nor any of the
later ones undertakes to define the term "ad coelum," if indeed that term is one of constancy or could be defined. In
every case in which it is to be found it was used in connection with occurrences common to the era, such as overhanging eaves or branches. These decisions are relied upon to
define the rights of the new and rapidly growing business
of aviation. This cannot be done consistently with the traditional policy of the courts to adapt the law to the economic
and social needs of the times. * * * We cannot hold that in

every case it is a trespass against the owner of the soil to
fly an aeroplane through the air space overlying the surface.
This does not mean that the owner of the surface has no
right at all in the air space above his land. He has a
dominant right of occupancy for purposes incident to his use
and enjoyment of the surface, and there may be such a continuous and permanent use of the lower stratum which he
many reasonably expect to occupy himself as to impose a
servitude upon his use and enjoyment of the surface. * * *
As to the upper stratum which he may not reasonably expect to occupy, he has no right, it seems to us, except to prevent the use of it by others to the extent of an unreasonable
interference with his complete enjoyment of the surface.
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His remedy for this latter use, we think, is an action for
nuisance and not trespass."
In 1942 in Delta Air Corporationv. Kersey 22 the maxim
was again discussed. Here Kersey brought suit against the
city of Atlanta to enjoin the city and others from operating
an airport and the facts were much the same as those in the
Swetland case in Ohio, except here the airport was constructed and was operating so that actual damages could be
shown. The chief complaint was against the low flying of
the planes in taking off and landing directly over the roof
of plaintiff's house. The Georgia code in section 105-1409
states that "the owner of realty having title downwards and
upwards indefinitely, an unlawful interference with his
rights, below or above the surface alike gives him a right of
action."

The court in deciding the case said: " * * * An able

discussion of the common law maxim expressed in these
sections and the construction to be given to it with respect
to the recently developed field of aviation is contained in
the Thrasher case."
In refusing to give these sections a
meaning that would make any and every aerial flight over
the land of another a trespass, it was said, 'The space in the
far distance above the earth is in actual possession of no
one, and being incapable of such possession title to the land
beneath does not necessarily include title to such space. The
legal title can hardly extend above an altitude representing
the reasonable possibility of man's occupation and dominion,
although as respects the realms beyond this the owner of
the land may complain of any use tending to diminish the
free enjoyment of the soil beneath. Perhaps the owner of
the land may be considered as being in actual possession
of the space immediately covering the trees, buildings, and
structures affixed to the soil, so that the act of navigating a
plane through this stratum could be condemned as a trespass.;;
22
23

Delta Air Corporation v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S. E. (2d) 245.
Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 99 A. L. R. 158 (1934).
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The Hinman case 24 in 1936 was based on the rights of a
landowner above whose land planes were alleged to have
trespassed. They alleged, among other things, that the Hinmans owned and were in possession of 72Y2 acres of real
property "together with a stratum of air-space superjacent
to and overlying said tract, and extending upwards to
such an altitude as plaintiffs may reasonably expect now
or hereafter to utilize, use or occupy said air space." The
court said in deciding the case "Appellees contend that it
is settled law in California that the owner of land has no
property rights in superjacent airspace either by code enactments or by judicial decrees and that the ad coelum doctrine
does not apply in California. We have examined the statutes
of California * * * but we find nothing therein to negative
the ad coelum formula. Furthermore, if we should adopt
this formula as being the law, there might be serious doubts
as to whether a state statute could change it without running
counter to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. If we could accept and literally construe the ad coelum doctrine it would simplify the solution
of this case; however, we reject that doctrine. We think it
is not the law, and that it never was the law."
Continuing, the court said: "This formula 'from the
center of the earth to the sky' was invented at some remote
time in the past when the use of space above land actual or
conceivable was confined to narrow limits, and simply meant
that the owner of the land could use the overlying space to
such an extent as he was able. * * *
"This formula was never taken literally, but was a figurative phrase to express the full and complete ownership of
land and the right to whatever superjacent airspace was
necessary or convenient to the enjoyment of the land.
"In applying a rule of law, or construing a statute or constitutional provision, we cannot shut our eyes to common
knowledge, the progress of civilization, or the experience of
24

Hinman et al v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. (2d) 755 (1936).
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mankind. A literal construction of this formula will bring
about an absurdity. The sky has no definite location. It
is that which presents itself to the eye when looking upward; as we approach it, it recedes. * * * There can be no
ownership of infinity, nor can equity prevent a supposed
violation of an abstract conception."
In discussing the possibility of ownership of airspace unconnected with land, the judge stated that such title is "inmconceivable," and that such a right had never been asserted,
and was a thing unknown to the law. At that moment, however, the deed to the Chicago property giving Marshall Field,
later Mr. Kennedy by transfer of title from Field, states
that title to air space was granted. The huge Merchandise
Mart stands upon this spot and is occuping the space or a
part of it, so that a use is being made. But supposing no
building was built upon it and at some time an action in trespass was brought against an alleged trespasser by airplane,
it is assumed that there could be no defense raised on the
theory that the air is not owned by the plaintiff.
The California judge, in the Hinman case, supra, claimed
the proposition of ownership of airspace is too new for any
court to find a legal precedent upon which to lay the decision. Of course he is right in saying that such reasoning
was never pursued in the history of jurisprudence until the
occasion was furnished by the common use of vehicles of the
air. Little aid was to be found in actual precedent but the
solution could be and was found in the application of elementary legal principles. The first and foremost of these
principles is that the origin or the legal right of property is
dominion over it. Property must have been reclaimed from
the general mass of the earth, and must by its nature, be
capable of exclusive possession. The air, like the sea, is br
its nature incapable of private ownership as we usually regard the meaning of the word "ownership," except as one
actually uses it. It is upon this theory that our water rights
are based.
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Actually, we may conclude that a man may own so much
of the space above his land as he uses in connection with the
enjoyment of the land. The limits are not fixed but vary
with the needs of the owners. All the rest of the air belongs
to the public. When we say a man owns the air to the
heavens, then, it merely means that he is not to be limited
in any use he may make of it in his enjoyment of the land.
His title is paramount.
But any use of the space by others which interferes with
the enjoyment by the owner of the land would be a trespass
for which the law gives him a remedy.
Until some definite regulations are promulgated to give
the courts a guide in determining cases based on trespass
by aeroplanes, there will continue to be much variance in
the decisions, but it seems that -the courts all over the country are consistently refusing to apply the "ad coelum" doctrine in these cases. They proceed rather upon the theory
of nuisance and insist that the plaintiff be able -toshow damages to the property or person before a judgment will be
rendered in his favor. The tendency of the courts and of
lawyers is to abandon the maxim completely and to proceed
upon the nuisance theory in cases where a century ago nothing more than the maxim would have been required to form
a basis for an action.
Lora D. Lashbrook.

